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Budget Deficit and Monetary Growth Targets:

Macroeconomic consequences in an optimizing model
 
Abstract
 
In this paper, I analyze financial programs of the types adopted in the 
U.K., U.S.A., and in many developing countries under the auspices of the 
International Monetary Fund. I show that such a program has the effect of 
stabilizing the relevant macroeconomic system, as to be expected following a 
result established by Tobin and Buiter (1976). Additionally, I show that when 
budget deficit and monetary targets are pursued the government must choose at 
least two policy variables endogenously. I find support for these results in 
the macroeconomic performances of the U.K. economy in the 1980s. I also examine 
the effects of changes in certain policies on the steady state values and on the 
values along the transition path to such a state. 
Budget Deficit and Monetary Growth Targets:

Macroeconomic consequences in an optimizing model
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to assess theoretical implications of a 
neoclassical optimizing monetary growth model and relate these implications to 
actual macroeconomic performances following a simultaneous adoption of targets 
for government budget deficit levels and monetary growth rates. Although such 
financial programs are now common in both developing and developed countries, 
this paper is motivated by the policy package introduced in the U.K. in 1980. 
The government announced a comprehensive strategy to reduce then high rates of 
inflation and budget deficits by adopting a Medium Term Financial Strategy 
(~lTFS) consisting of a monetary and a budget deficit target. Because of the 
sustained commitment to reducing government budget deficits and controlling the 
growth rates of money, examination of macroeconomic performances of the U.K. 
economy since the adoption of the ~lTFS provides valuable insights into the 
likely economic effects of implementing such a policy. 
The U.S. and several developing countries introduced a somewhat similar 
policy but without the same level of sustained commitment. The U.S. Congress 
became worried in 1984 that the actual and projected high budgetary deficits as 
well as the debt-service ratio would jeopardize the economic recovery that began 
in the previous year. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law was enacted in 1985 with a 
view to achieving successively lower projected budget deficit levels and a 
balanced budget now by 1995. The targeting of the monetary aggregates was 
effectively abandoned by then, but because of the separation of powers between 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve the money supply remains an exogenous 
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policy variable to the fiscal authorities. In this sense, current U.S. policies 
are comparable to a financial program in other countries. Among developing 
countries, over 90 countries have adopted such programs between 1950 and 1989, 
usually requiring a reduced ratio of government budget deficit to gross domestic 
product and a ceiling on the money supply.l On the average, each developing 
country implemented these programs for 8 years while receiving balance of 
payments support from the International ~Ionetary Fund (I~IT). Therefore, these 
programs were not always implemented by the country authorities over a 
continuous period. 
Although policy implications of maintaining a financial program are 
important in a broad range of countries, existing theoretical literature has not 
dealt with the simultaneous adoption of targets for budget deficits and money 
growth. There are two predominant views in the existing literature on the 
effect of budget deficits. According to the Keynesians, budget deficits are 
expansionary for output, employment, and prices. On the other hand, 
neoclassical economists assert that in a closed economy high budget deficits 
will be associated with higher interest rates, private consumption, lower 
savings and investment activities, and a slower subsequent growth in the 
economy's output. In a small open economy with flexible exchange rates and 
capital mobility, domestic interest rate will not rise as the demand for savings 
will be satisfied by incipient capital inflows. Any discrepancy between 
national and foreign interest rates will be reflected in the foreign currency 
premia or discount in the for'vard market where foreign currency traders use the 
interest parity condition to make forward exchange quotations. Yellen (1989) 
lThe ceiling is usually specified on domestic credit expansion, which is on the 
asset side of a monetary survey. 
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argues that a combination of these outcomes is likely. On tight monetary 
policy, Friedman (1968) asserted that controlling the growth rate of money will 
ultimately contribute to a reduced inflation path. This view was challenged by 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) in situations where real interest rates on government 
bonds are positive. A number of authors, including Drazen (1985), Liviatan 
(1984), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), confirm, in the context of a 
neoclassical model with output treated fixed, the Sargent and Wallace result 
that attempts to lower inflation with reduced money growth could imply high 
current and future inflation. Haque (1985) contradicts this result within a 
neoclassical model that allows movements in the capital stock to induce effects 
on money demand. 
The literatures on budget deficits and tight money are not appropriate in 
discussing financial packages such as those pursued in the U.K., U.S.A., and 78 
developing countries. Because such a package involves a budget deficit and 
money supply targets, these restrictions must be satisfied simultaneously with 
the government budget constraint and private behavioral equations. A 
neoclassical growth model is used in this paper to derive the theoretical 
implications of a financial package similar to the U.K. MTFS. The principal 
policy changes in the U.K. in the 1980s has been embodied in the ~lTFS. 
Therefore, in the following analysis I neglect the exchange rate policy and the 
performance of the external sector. Macroeconomic performances in the U.K. 
during 1980s provide some evidence for the main results of this paper regarding 
dynamic stability and endogeneity of two policy variables in a typical financial 
program. However, because of the following changes made mid-stream in the 
selection of endogenous policies and the limited period for which data is 
available, a comparison of the transitional effects of a policy change under 
4 
different combinations of endogenous policies is not meaningful. The 
theoretical result indicates a reduction in the fiscal deficit will not affect 
the transitional real interest rate (and, hence, capital accumulation) if bond 
issue and lump sum taxes are the two endogenous policies. In the case of the 
U.K., North Sea oil revenues initially helped in satisfying the constraints and 
such revenues are not dissimilar to lump sum taxes. Subsequently, discretionary 
government expenditures were made the second endogenous policy which according 
to the theory will affect the transitional real interest rate. 
Tables 1 and 2 present selected economic indicators in the U.K. between 
1974 and 1987. Table 1 shows that the authorities successfully reduced the 
budget deficit to gross national product ratio by 2 percentage points following 
the implementation of the MTFS. In the early 1980s, this reduction was achieved 
because of improved revenue performances owing to higher royalties and taxes 
from the North Sea oil production. Higher royalties and oil-related taxes 
permitted the authorities to raise the expenditure ratios without raising the 
budget deficit ratios. Beginning 1984, as the oil sector weakened, 
discretionary expenditures were reduced to achieve lower budget deficit ratios. 
With respect to money growth, the authorities targeted a variety of national 
monetary aggregates. These definitions differ from those found in the I~W's 
International Financial Statistics, the data source for this paper. 
Nevertheless, I~W definitions used in Table 1 provide a useful benchmark for 
comparing yearly changes. Narrow and broad money grew more rapidly ln the 19808 
compared to in the 1970s~ Both concepts of money grew less rapidly ln the early 
1980s before they started to rise again. These outcomes reflect several 
factors. First, the difficulties the authorities experienced in targeting 
monetary aggregates. Second, distortions in the published data series owing to 
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reclassifications of financial institutions several times during the period. 
Third, sizable statistical discrepancies in the published data. Examining the 
asset side of the monetary survey provides more insight into factors that 
affected monetary growth. In the 1980s, domestic credit expanded more rapidly, 
contributed primarily by lending to the private sector and closely .followed by 
lending to other institutions. Credit expansion to the government sector was 
nearly zero and, as a result, the share of the domestic credit taken by the 
government sector fell sharply while those of the private and others rose. The 
rise in the private sector share and a corresponding fall in the government 
sector were partially contributed by the selling-off of the state-owned 
enterprises to the private sector. 
Against the background of a successful budget deficit reduction program and 
attempted targets for money aggregates, performances of selected other economic 
variables are highlighted in Table 2. It shows that the consumer price increase 
slowed sharply and that the nominal bank lending rate fell somewhat. Employment 
level fell severely in the first two years and, although it began rising 
starting 1983, employment in 1986 (latest year for which data is readily 
available) remained 3 percent below its 1979 level. The ratio of gross national 
savings to GNP fell, and the gross domestic investment ratio fell more sharply. 
Clearly, the domestic economy could not absorb all the national savings. 
Indeed, in the first seven years, residents used some of their savings to invest 
abroad. In 1987, a reversal in net investment abroad took place on a small 
scale. Overall, the mean savings ratio fell in the 1980s relative to the 
previous period and while the mean investment ratio also fell it remained 
virtually flat in each year. Whereas foreign savings, acquired by maintaining 
external current account deficits, provided almost 5 percent of total investment 
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In the 1970s, even the low national savings in the 1980s exceeded investment 
needs by over 6 percent. This happened when foreign interest rates fell more 
rapidly than U.K. interest rates. Following a recession in 1980 and 1981, GDP 
grew between 1 and 4 percent so that the mean growth in the 1980s was 1.8 
percent compared with 1.5 percent in the previous period. 
In the balance of this paper, I discuss in section 2 the theoretical 
implications of the model developed in the Appendix A. The model allows for 
changes in the capital stock and, hence, in the level of output. But, in 
Appendix B, I consider how the results might change if output is considered 
fixed. Finally, in section 3, I make some concluding remarks. 
2. An optimizing model: Theoretical implications 
I develop a Sidrauski-Brock optimizing monetary growth model in Appendix A 
and establish the following results for a financial program. First, the 
imposition of a budget deficit target to a model with a government budget 
constraint requires now two endogenous policy variables instead of one. Second, 
the steady state solutions of the model are unique. Third, the economy always 
evolves along its unique stable path to this steady state. Given these results, 
I analyze in and out of steady state the implications of a change in the deficit 
ratio, in nominal money, and in nominal money growth. 
A Financial Program 
A financial program consists of a government budget constraint, a budget 
deficit target, and an independent path for the money supply. For simplicity, 
consider a closed economy where (a) the government does not undertake investment 
and (b) the sources of the government's revenues are costless issuance of base 
money, interest-bearing securities issued as perpetuity bonds, and the 
7
 
collection of lump sum and marginal taxes on private incomes. Because the 
government budget deficit is equal to the excess of government spending plus net 
interest payments over tax revenue, the government budget constraint is simply 
the requirement that any deficit must be financed either by issuing money or 
bonds. At each instant, this requirement implies that 
g + (l-t)eb - T - tf(k) =m+ AD + (m+Ab)~. (1) 
The left hand side of this equation is the real budget deficit while the right 
side is an indication that this deficit may be financed by either issuing real 
money (M/P) or real bonds (ABIP). The variables are defined as follows: 
g = real government spending, t = marginal tax rate, e = nominal coupon payment 
on a bond, b =B/P = real bonds, B = number of bonds, P = price of goods, 
T = lump sum tax, f(k) = production as a function of capital to labor ratio (k), 
m =M/P = real money balance, A = price of a real bond (b), and ~ =PIP = fully 
anticipated rate of inflation. In this specification of the government budget, 
government policy decisions relate to five variables. These are real government 
spending (g), real taxes (t and T), monetary policy (~1), and bond issues (B). 
Literature addressing government budget constraint has now established that 
at most four of these preceding policy variables may be chosen independently and 
the fifth then determined to balance the government budget, given the structure 
of the economy and its agents' preferences. The second specification in a 
financial program involving an additional constraint imposed through a 
restriction on the size of the budget deficit will place a further limitation on 
the government's ability to choose freely its policy variables. It does not 
matter analytically whether this restriction on deficit is specified in levels 
or in ratio to gross domestic product. Consider 
g + (l-t)eb - T - tf(k) =Rf(k) , R > o. (2) 
8
 
Equation (2) indicates that the budget deficit ratio is required to be some 
arbitrary ratio R. This type of formulation is more common in the I~~-supported 
financial programs introduced in the developing countries. In the U.K., the 
MTFS has included a deficit target such as (2) with R declining over time. The 
preceding equation may be used in analyzing the feasibilitv of a financial 
program. 
Finally, an independent monetary policy requires specifying a path for the 
money supply. If nominal money grows at a constant rate Band at the initial 
date the outstanding nominal money stock (~Io) is predetermined, then real money 
balances grow according to 
m = (B-1!")m. (3) 
In the U.K., B has been specified for inside money as well as, since 1984, 
outside money (MO) that is close to the definition of Min this paper. The MTFS 
specified a declining B over time. 
Equations (A18) and (A20) in the appendix2 together imply that ,higher 
fiscal deficits Rf(k ) * are associated with higher real stock of bonds, higher 
lump sum taxes, unchanged goods prices and hence a higher path for the number of 
bonds. Since the capital stock remains unchanged, higher deficit ratios do not 
alter the steady state real interest rate. A previously unanticipated once and 
for all change in the nominal money stock ~I is neutral in the steady state. In 
particular, real balances remain intact which implies that price level P* change 
by an equivalent rate. With the real stock of bonds unchanged too, the higher 
price level implies a higher path for the number of bonds. Similarly, changing 
B does not affect the steady state values of real consumption, capital stock, or 
2Henceforth, an A preceding the Roman numbers for an equation indicates the 
equation is in the Appendix A. 
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output. In this sense, money is superneutral. The effect on the inflation 
rates is one for one: 
d~ * Ide = 1. 
Despite the preceding results, the deficit ratio may influence real 
interest rates and the effect of a change in money growth on inflation may also 
be different in the transition path to the steady state. Such dynamic paths are 
analyzed below for changes in these two policies. The differential equations 
system (A23) is used to discuss comparative dynamics. First, consider the 
dynamic consequences of a change in the deficit ratio. The effect on the 
transition path is assessed by calculating the eigenvectors corresponding to the 
stable eigenvalues. This is not necessary in this particular case. From the 
preceding discussion of comparative statics, changes in R only alters the number 
of bonds, real bonds, and lump sum taxes. In the differential equation system 
(A23), R and b* appear only in the fifth row so changes in R only influence the 
fifth elements of the two eigenvectors. Since k * , c * , and m * are unaffected, 
and the first three elements of the eigenvectors are independent of R and b , * 
from equations (A24) and (A25) inflation and real interest rates along the 
transition path are independent of R. However, if government spending rather 
than lump sum taxes is endogenous, then changes in capital accumulations and 
bondholdings are induced directly. The intrinsic dynamics of the system remains 
stable, but changes in real interest and inflation rates follow. An alternative 
formulation to this paper would incorporate government spending in the welfare 
function (A1) in a nonlinear fashion in which g would alter agent's marginal 
rates of substitution between consumption and real balances. In and out of 
steady state analysis of such a general version will provide a richer insights 
on the real consequences of high deficit ratios. In the interest of brevity, 
and as a first approach, the simple version of (A1) is considered in this paper. 
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Consider now the consequences of a reduced B. A rigorous assessment is 
possible by solving for the unique negative eigenvalue of the top left hand side 
3x3 block of the differential equations system (A23) , but this is not necessary. 
It was shown earlier that in the steady state the inflation rate will fall 
whenever money growth is reduced. Given also the regular saddlepath condition, 
at the very worst, attempts to reduce the path of inflation through monetary 
contraction will initially raise it. For an additive separable utility 
function, it is shown below that inflation rates will rise before gradually 
falling to the desired rate. 
By definition, U* =°implies E =0. Then, immediately from (A23), threecm 
are * * ~ + B): only one of these is negative. The remaining tworoots (-J2m , -B,
 
roots are obtained from the top left hand side 2x2 submatrix:
 
2A 1 = (¢ + ot)/(l-t) + ~ (¢ + bt)J (1- t) + rDF > ° (4a) 
2A 2 = (¢ + ot ) / (1- t) - ~ (¢ + bt) J(1- t) + 4DF < ° (4b) 
The two initial conditions on equations system (A23) remain relevant when 
E =0, and therefore the dynamic system continues to be a regular saddlepath. 
The evolution of dynamic variables depends on the eigenvectors corresponding to 
the stable eigenvalues: -B and "2' The eigenvector of -B is (O,O,O,O,n), where 
n is an arbitrary constant. This is convenient because the path of the 
inflation rate is influenced by changes in the path of (k,c,m) as equations 
(A24) and (A25) suggest. From the steady state analysis, neither consumption 
nor capital stock is influenced by changes in the growth rate of nominal money 
supply B. In other words, with D and fll unaffected, the unique stable root A2 
and the unstable root Ai remain the same. 
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The paths of interest and inflation rates in deviation from their steady 
state values are, up to a factor of constant proportionality,3 
A2s; = EF e (5a) 
(5b) 
*where E = k - k .o 
Changes in the nominal growth rate of money do not affect A1, A2 , and F. 
The constant E is also unaffected since its value is determined from the initial 
condition provided by the predetermined capital stock ko which cannot alter 
instantaneously In response to an unanticipated policy change. With these 
3The solutions to the differential equations are obtained by calculating the 
eigenvectors corresponding to the stable eigenvalues. The eigenvector
corresponding to A2 is derived as follows. Denote the transpose of the 
non-trivial eigenvector corresponding to A2 as V
T 
= (Vl,V2,V3,V4,V5)' Then from 
equations system (A23), the first three elements may be written as 
where V1 is arbitrary. Hence, by taking V1 = 1, the paths for (k,c,m) In 
deviations are 
(I) 
The constant E is derived from the initial condition on the capital stock, 
namely, E = k - k.* Substitute these solutions in (A24) and (A25) to obtaino 
equations (5). See Haque (1985) for more details. 
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results in mind, the dynamic implication of changes in B on the path of 
inflation is obtained by differentiating equation (5b)4: 
Equation (6) provides the new path for inflation in the transition period to the 
steady state. Once the steady state is reached, the relevant equation for 
examining inflation path is (A10): when a reduction in money growth will have a 
reduced steady state inflation. Consider the case where the initial endowment 
of the capital stock is less than the steady state level. If the utility 
function is quadratic, so that Ummm =0, the deviation of inflation from its 
steady state rate is positive, indicating that inflation will rise in the 
transition path following a cut in money growth. These results, together with 
the fact that the dynamic system (A23) is a regular saddlepoint convergent, 
suggest that after an initial increase in the inflation rates such rates will 
4From the definition of J1 and J2 when U* =0,cm 
Hence, 
and 
* * * * *d/dB(m J2) = m Ummm/Uc dm IdB + 1. 
Substituting for these derivatives, the second RES expression of equation (6) is 
obtained. 
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begin to fall along the transition path to equal the lower rate prevailing In 
the steady state. 
The phase during which inflation rises following a cut in money growth 
depends on the parameter values, initial endowment of capital stock relative to 
its steady state value, and the steady state solutions. For purely illustrative 
purpose, consider: ¢ =0.10, 8 =0.08 (ex post), 0 =0.05, t =0.25, g = 1, 
f(k) = kO. 8, and U(c,m) = cO. 8 + mO. 2. These configurations imply, in common 
units, k* =1024, c * =203.8, and m * =5.7; A1 = 0.26, A2 =-0.1134, and the 
steady state elasticity of real money balance with respect to the growth rate of 
money is a minus 0.56. In the example where 1 = ko/k* < 1, the inflation effect 
is given by the following relationship: 
- ~ = (1-1) 0.0685 eO.1134s > 0. 
The preceding relationship implies that the larger is the 1-ratio, the longer it 
takes for the inflation rates to reach the steady state values. 5 Second, a 
reduced 8 induces higher inflation rates in the transition path; if 1 = 0.5, the 
lower steady state rate is attained after 29 periods. 
Thus far a variable capital stock, and hence a variable output, has been 
assumed. The implications of a fixed output for a dual financial target is 
considered in Appendix B. 
5That is, in developing countries such as Brazil and India, for example, where 
the current capital stock is low relative to their steady state level a lower 
inflation path is achieved much faster than in industrialized countries where 
this ratio is high. 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have derived two main results that add to the government 
budget constraint literature. A well known result in this literature is that at 
least one government policy variable must be endogenously determined to balance 
the government budget. I show that when budget deficit and monetary targets are 
pursued, the government must choose at least two policy variables endogenously. 
A second well established result in the literature is that endogenous bond 
financing is least stable among alternative types of financings. I show that 
when a budget deficit target is pursued the dynamic stability of a macroeconomic 
system is unambiguous. This result is similar to that established by Tobin and 
Buiter (1976) in the IS-L~l context. These results appear to be confirmed by the 
performances of the U.K. economy in the 1980s. Thus, financial programs of the 
types adopted in the U.K., U.S.A., and in developing countries under the 
auspices of the International Monetary Fund have the effect of stabilizing the 
relevant macroeconomic system but the programs limit further independent choices 
of government policies. 
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Appendix A: The Model 
In this appendix, I specify an optimizing model to derive private 
behavioral equations (section 1), and then I analyze the uniqueness of the 
steady state (section 2) and dynamic stability (section 3). 
1. The Private Economy 
A financial program consisting of equations (1) to (3) in the text is 
satisfied by the simultaneous interactions with private behavioral equations as 
well as with the goods market-clearing condition. I develop a Sidrauski-Brock 
optimizing model over an infinite horizon and under perfect foresight to obtain 
conditions for private behavior. Although the issues addressed in this paper 
could be analyzed by extending the model as in Blanchard (1985), the model 
developed is of sufficient generality for the main point of this paper: 
exogenous money supply and a budget deficit target requires two endogenous 
policy variables and this has the effect of stabilizing the macroeconomic 
system. 
Suppressing time subscripts, the representative agent's instantaneous 
welfare function is denoted as 
where 
W= U(c,m) 
+ + 
c and m denote real private consumption and real money balances. 
(A1) 
The 
representative agent maximizes (A1) over time subject to the stock and flow 
constraints which are described below. The wealth of each agent is composed of 
real money balances, equity, and the (per capita) market value of outstanding 
government bonds. Initially, it is assumed that the coupon payments on 
government bonds are fixed in nominal values. If B is the number of bonds and P 
is the price of goods, then denote b =B/P so that Ab is the real value of bonds 
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and A is the price of b. Assuming that Tobin's q is unity, the agent's real 
wealth is: 
a = m + k + Ab. (A2) 
The time derivative of the preceding relation gives the following equation for 
asset accumulation: 
a =m+ K+ Ab + AD. (A3) 
The representative agent is assumed to receive all production income as 
well as debt interest on public bond holdings.! The production function is a 
linear homogeneous function of labor and the capital stock (k). Assume the 
labor supply is perfectly inelastic and is fully described by f(k).2 Taxation 
consists of a lump sum T and a marginal rate t applicable to all sources of 
income. In this formulation, depreciation expenditures are not tax deductible. 
The net of tax income is used to consume, make gross investment, or accumulate 
cash balances and bond holdings. Thus, the income constraint is 
(l-t) [f(k) + eb] - T = C + K+ Ok + M/P + An/P 
= c + K+ Ok + m+ m~ + A(D+b~) (A4) 
where e is the fixed nominal coupon value on a perpetuity, a is the rate of 
capital depreciation, ~ =PIP is the fully anticipated rate of inflation. 
Replacement investment is Ok while net investment is K. Substituting (A3) into 
(A4) yields the following flow constraint: 
!The assumption that the,agent receives all production income is consistent with 
a corporate sector financing its investment from borrowed funds. Brock and 
Turnovsky (1981) have shown that the dynamic structure of the economy would 
alter when corporate investments are financed by alternative methods. In the 
interests of simplicity, in what follows corporate investment are financed by
borrowing from private agents. 
2The assumption of inelastic labor supply is implicit in the specification of 
the welfare function (A4) when the latter is derived from a consumption-leisure 
choice framework where money facilitates reduced transaction costs. 
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(l-t) [f(k) + eb] - T = C + Ok + (m+)b)Jr + a - Ab. (A5) 
Thus, the representative agent's decision problem is to choose a path for 
(c,k,M,B,a), given an expected path for (),P,t,T,g) and the initial values 
(Mo,Bo,ko) to maximize the present value of (A4) subject to equations (A2) and 
(A5). In particular, applying the constant rate of time discount ¢, identical 
agents are assumed to maximize the present value of welfare over an infinite 
horizon and under perfect foresight. Hence, denoting the Lagrangian multipliers 
of the stock and flow constraints as P and li', respectively, the Lagrangian is 
J~ [U( c ,m)+p{a- m- k-)b }+a{ (1- t) [f (k)+eb] - T- c- 01:- (m+-\b) Jr- a+Ab}] e- ¢sds (A6) 
over all future time s. 
Assume U is concave so that 
UccUmm 
2 
- Ucm ~ O. (A7) 
Then, sufficient conditions for the problem in (A6) to have an internal optimum 
are the first order conditions, Euler equation (A8.4) below, and the 
transversality condition 
lim li' a e-¢s = o. 
s -+ 00 
This condition may be checked by using the finite steady state solutions. 3 
Letting r =Pia and eliminating li', the equations for an internal optimum 
when (A6) is solved are: 
3Since li' is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the flow constraint 
.expressed in terms of the asset accumulation a, it represents the additional 
value to welfare from increased asset accumulation. Thus li' is the shadow price
of asset accumulation. Hence, the transversality condition is the requirement 
that the present value of assets, evaluated at the shadow price, must equal 
zero. This condition is satisfied in dynamic systems which converge to a steady 
state. 
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Money market: Urn = Uc(r + Ir) (A8.1) 
Capital market: (l-t)f'(k) = r + 0 (A8.2) 
Bond market: A/A + (l-t)e/A =r + Ir (A8.3) 
Euler equation: 
- Dc/U = r - ~ (A8.4)c 
where f'(k) = d/dk(f(k)). The preceding four equations include a particular 
individual optimal value of c, m, and k. They do not include such an optimal 
value for b because the instantaneous relationship in (A6) is linear in b. So, 
while (A8.2) ties down a unique value of capital (k), there is no equivalent 
condition for bonds (b). Also, the level of government spending does not appear 
in the preceding conditions because the welfare function does not include such 
spending in a nonlinear fashion. Such a specification does not allow analyzing 
the issues involved when government spending is a substitute for private 
consumption. 4 
Goods market-clearing is assumed. Since output is divided among private 
plus public consumption and gross private investment, this implies 
f(k) = c + g + ~ + Ok. (A9) 
2. Steady State Analysis 
The feasibility of the financial program is assured if the model 
represented by equations (1) to (3) in the paper and (A8) to (A9) in this 
4Equations system (A8) is used to discuss the term structure of interest. 
Because the real (implicit) return on (long) bonds is r and on real balance is 
-Ir, the additional risk premium on bonds is r+lr. This is exactly equal to the 
nominal interest rate. Similarly, because the real return on capital (after tax 
and depreciation adjustments) is (r+o)/(l-t), the additional risk premium on 
equity is (r+o)/(l-t) + Ir. This is the marginal product of capital plus the 
fully anticipated inflation rate. That is, the risk premium on equity exceeds 
that on bonds to account for capital depreciations and marginal tax rates. The 
additional risk premium on equity relative to bonds is (o+rt)/(l-t). When the 
tax rate is zero, this is equal to the rate of capital depreciations. 
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appendix has a unique forward-looking path as its solution. The necessary and 
sufficient conditions for this path being unique are that there exist unique 
steady state values, a convergent subspace in the equations system that 
describes the dynamic evolution of the economy, and an exact number of initial 
conditions to tie down a unique point in the convergent subspace. 
Denote the steady state values by superscript * I assume the real money 
stock is constant in the steady state so the perfectly anticipated inflation 
rate equals the rate of nominal money growth (see equation 3) -- i.e., 
* 
r = B. (A10) 
From equation (AS.4), the real interest rate is equal to the rate of pure time 
discount: 
r * = ~ (All) 
because I assume real consumption and real money balances are constant. 
Equation (AS.2) then implies 
(l-t)f'(k*) = ~ + 8 (A12) 
and so this modified golden rule establishes a unique capital stock. Because 
the nominal interest rate (~ + B) and the coupon payment on bonds (e) are 
constant, the bond price A* must be constant. Indeed, from equation (AS.3) 
A* = (l-t)e/(~+B). (A13) 
Since real wealth must be constant, and A* is constant, it follows that 
o= O. (A14) 
The expression for the goods market clearing condition is: 
* * *f(k ) = c + g + 8k (A15) 
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and it determines a unique private consumption level * c given the level of real 
public spending and the rate of capital depreciation. 5 
* *With a unique real consumption (c ), demand for real money balances (m ) is 
then solved from the money market condition (A8.i). 
* * * *Um(c ,m )jUc(c ,m ) = ~ + B. (A16) 
But, because this condition is nonlinear, m * may have multiple solutions. The 
following analysis establishes that, provided money and consumption are normal 
or inferior goods and remain so far all feasible solutions, then the money 
market condition solves for a unique m. * The slope of the money market 
condition in the (c,m)-plane is 
dm* 
~ = - J1/J2, (A17)
dc 
where J1 = (UcmUc-UccUm)/U~ and J2 = (UmmUc-UcmUm)jU~. 
Both J1 and J2 are evaluated at their steady state values. Restrictions 
J1 > 0 > J2 ensure money and consumption are normal goods. 6 Thus, the slope 
dm*Idc* is negative. Figures 1 and 2 show the graph for the money market 
condition, under the assumption of both normal or inferior goods. In two 
possible cases, given a unique c * = Co the money market condition provides a 
unique m * = mo. 
5Condition (A15) also shows that private consumption in the steady state is 
positive provided that output net of capital depreciation exceeds public 
consumption of goods and services. 
6The normality conditions are derived as follows. First, m~~imize U(c,m)
subject to the flow constraint pc + m= y. Second, take total derivative of c 
and m with respect to y. Conditions dcldy > 0 and dmjdy > 0 imply that c and m 
are normal goods. See Fischer (1979). 
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Figure 1 Figure 2 
m 
* m =mo 
Money
market 
condition 
m 
* m =m 
o 
Money
market 
condition 
o c *=co c o *c =co c 
Money and consumption are normal Either money or consumption is an 
goods or both are inferior. inferior good. 
Thus, even though the money market condition is nonlinear, m * is unique under 
the standard assumption that money and consumption goods are normal. 
There remain expressions for the government budget constraint and the 
budget deficit targets: 
* * * 
m e = g - T - tf(k ) + ~(l-t)eb /(~+e) (A18) 
Rf(k*) = g - T - tf(k*) + (l-t)eb*. (A19) 
A knowledge of k * , m , * and A* and the constant parameters is sufficient to solve 
for a unique real bond stock b * from the government budget constraint, 
simultaneously satisfying itself and the private sector's optimal behavioral 
equations. The real bond stock thus obtained must be unique precisely because 
the equation is linear in the unknown. 7 However, unique values of the capital 
stock and the number of bonds will not generally satisfy the steady state 
version of the real budget deficit target, equation (A19). Hence, given a real 
budget deficit target, it is not generally feasible to set independent paths for 
7From equation (A18) , the real bond stock is positive if total government 
revenue, inclusive of inflation tax, exceeds government expenditure on goods and 
services. At an intuitive level, a positive real bond stock consistent with a 
steady state is possible if the government's tax revenue is sufficient to 
finance interest payments on a constant real stock of perpetuity bonds. 
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government spending, taxes, and the money supply. At least one must be 
determined endogenously, together with the number of bonds. If the marginal tax 
rate is specified as an endogenous policy variable, then the steady state values 
are not unique in general. This means that it is not possible to rule out 
multiple perfect foresight paths. Instead, either real government spending or 
lump sum taxes must be made endogenous to avoid this problem of multiple paths. 
In the formulation of this paper, these two have qualitatively similar steady 
state and dynamic stability properties because government spending does not 
enter the utility function in a nonlinear fashion. 
To show how a real stock of bonds b* and lump sum tax T * or discretionary 
government spending g * are chosen to balance the government budget and satisfy 
the budget deficit target, substitute for T or g from the government budget 
constraint into (A18) to obtain 
* * * * Rf(k) = O(m + A b ). (A20) 
* * * * With k , m ,A already solved, the preceding equation determines b given the 
*steady state fiscal deficit Rf(k). In particular, 
* b* = [Rf(k ) - m*J/A*. 
() 
By substituting this unique value of b * in the government budget constraint 
(A17) , the following equation is obtained: 
* * * g + ¢Rf(k )/0 = (¢ + O)m + T + tf(k ). 
This equation then determines a unique g * or T * to satisfy the government budget 
constraint. 
The establishment of unique steady state values in the preceding analyses 
confirms that a financial program similar to the ~ITFS In the U.K. is feasible 
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with bond issues and lump sum taxation or government spending as two 
simultaneous endogenous policy decisions. 8 The question of dynamic stability is 
addressed below. 
3. Stability Analysis 
The dynamic path is examined by linearizing the behavioral equations, the 
money supply rule, the government budget constraint, and the real budget deficit 
target in the neighborhood of the unique steady state equilibrium. The 
government budget constraint (1), the budget deficit target (2), and the money 
supply rule imply (3): 
Rf(k) = mB + A(n + b~). (A21) 
Denoting vector transpose by T, the following notation is adopted: 
x
T 
= (k,c,m,A,b) x =x - x* X = d/ds(~). 
Linearizing the dynamic equations and neglecting the second and higher order 
terms in the Taylor expansion, the following expressions are obtained 
K = (~ + b"t) / (1- t) k 
A 
- c (A22.1) 
J1 c + J2 m = r + ~ (A22.2) 
F k = r (A22.3)
* A A A) = A (r + ~) + (~ + B)A (A22.4) 
*. *. A * 
Uccc + Ucmm =- r U (A22.5)cA A * *A A *A 
Rf' k = Bm + A (n + b ~ + Bb) + Bb A (A22.6) 
* A 
m = - m ~ (A22.7) 
8This feasibility will not in general extend to the case of indexed coupon 
payments on government bonds. The compensation offered to economic*a~ents for 
inflation implies that there is no inflation tax on bonds (i.e., Bq b does not 
appear in equation (A20)). This means that in the steady state the inflation 
tax on money (Bm*) must equal the real budget deficit which in turn must equal
* * * Rf(k). With k , m , and B following a constant path, R cannot then be an 
exogenous variable. 
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where F :: (l-t)fll and f" = d/dk(f'(k)). 
The preceding seven equations are reduced to five by eliminating r and ~. 
In matrix notation, variational linearizations of the private behavioral 
equations, the government budget constraint, the budget deficit and money supply 
targets under endogenous bond and lump sum tax finance are 
l{ k(~+8t) / (1- t) -1 0 0 0 
. 
c -F(D+Em*) Em*J1 Em*J2 0 0 c 
m Fm* -m *J1 - m*J2 0 0 m (A23)=
 
0 A*J1 A*J2 (~ + 0) 0
 A 
b Fb*+Rf'/A* - b*J1 - b*2J2- 0/A * - Ob*/ A * -0 b 
* * * *I.here D :: Uc/U and E :: Ucm/U The solutions obtained for (k,c,m) are thencc cc . 
used to solve for r and ~ in the following equations. 
r = Fk (A24) 
~ = J1c + J2m- r. (A25) 
The triangular structure of the coefficient matrix in the differential 
equations system (A23) shows that two eigenvalues are -0 (negative provided 
o> 0) and ~ + 0 (positive). The remaining three eigenvalues are obtained from 
the top left hand side 3x3 submatrix, whose determinant is negative while the 
trace is positive. Hence, the 5x5 differential system has exactly two negative 
and three positive eigenvalues and is a regular saddlepath if, and only if, 
there are exactly two initial conditions. Real consumption (c), bond price (A) 
and the price of goods (p) are endogenous and capable of instantaneous jumps. 
Nominal money and the number of bonds are instantaneously predetermined. 
25
 
Although their real values may take on any value at the initial date, the jump 
in the price level cannot alter the money-to-bond ratio and this imposes one 
initial condition. The inherited capital stock ko (the outcome of previous 
investment decisions) is a second initial condition. Thus, under budget deficit 
and monetary targets, endogenous issuance of bonds and lump sum taxes or 
discretionary government spending, the economy is characterized by a regular 
saddlepath and it proceeds along its unique self-fulfilling and forward-looking 
convergent path to the steady state from the initial date on. 
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Appendix B: The case of fixed output 
If the capital stock is fixed, then from the goods market condition (A9) 
consumption is also fixed. The steady state solutions are again unique. The 
differential equations system (A23) is replaced by the following 3x3 sub-block: 
. 
mm 
° °
 
(¢ + 0) 
° 
(B1)= 
* * b-Ob /A -0 
The preceding dynamic equations system has a stable eigenvalue if 0 is 
positive; this is assumed. The non-trivial eigenvector corresponding to -8 is 
(O,O,n), where n is an arbitrary constant. Hence, the solution to (B1) is 
Os 
b
A 
= Ene
_ 
m=° A =° o 
where EO = b - b* (see Haque, 1985). That is, the stock of bonds b converges o 
to its steady state value at the rate 8. All other variables instantaneously 
achieve their steady state values. 
Consider what this implies for the inflation path. From (A24) and (A25), 
since c = m = k =0, ~ =0. Together with the money supply rule (3), this 
implies ~ = ~ * =e for all time, where 0 is the growth rate of nominal money. 
That is, tight money will always reduce inflation, and this result holds for the 
general utility function specified in this paper. Such a strong result is 
obtained precisely because of the speci!ication of a budget deficit target, 
additional to a money supply target. 
In a related literature, Liviatan (1984) has shown that when a money supply 
rule is pursued, and the utility function is logarithmic additive separable In 
consumption and real money balances, equations (B1), (A24) , and (A25) imply high 
current and future inflation when restrictive monetary policy is pursued. 
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Drazen (1985) has shown that in all other types of additive separable utility 
functions provided the interest elasticity of demand for money is inelastic, the 
Sargent/Wallace and Liviatan result for dynamic quantity theory demand schedule 
has to be qualified. In particular, tight money now implies eventually a high e 
and inflation. This is exactly the result obtained in the original Sargent and 
Wallace example, although in their case the result held only for constant 
velocity quantity theory demand schedule. 
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